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Abstract 
British cities are becoming more culturally diverse, with migration a main driver. Is this 
growing diversity good for urban economies? This paper explores, using a new 16-year panel 
of UK cities. Over time, net migration affects both local labour markets and the wider 
economy. Average labour market impacts appear neutral. Dynamic effects may be positive on 
UK-born workers’ productivity and wages (via production complementarities for higher skill 
workers) or negative on employment (if migrants progressively displace lower-skill natives 
from specific sectors). The results, which survive causality checks, suggest both processes are 
operating in British cities. Long-term industrial decline and casualisation of entry-level jobs 
help explain the employment findings.  
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 1. Introduction  
 
This paper looks at the long term economic impacts of migration on British cities. The UK is 
becoming more ethnically and culturally diverse, with net migration one of the main drivers 
of change. The past decade and a half represents ‘the single biggest wave of immigration in 
British history’ (Goodhart 2010). Many new migrant communities have developed since the 
late 1990s; A8 accession in 2004 has led to a very large increase in arrivals from Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
 
These demographic changes have been heavily urbanised. And although many rural 
communities have seen very rapid growth in numbers of migrant workers, British cities have 
always had the biggest stocks of migrant (and minority) populations. Put simply, cities are 
‘where the diversity is’, and much of this is migrant-driven. So is the diversity that migrants 
bring good for urban economies?   
 
There is a large existing literature on the economic impacts of migration in the UK 
and elsewhere (see Dustmann et al 2008 for a recent summary). Most of these studies focus 
on the short-term effects of migrants in local or regional labour markets. Studies typically 
find little or no average impact of migrants on the wages or employment prospects of UK-
born (so-called ‘native’) workers; some turn up welfare losses for less-skilled groups via 
relative scarcity effects.  
 
Over time, however, migration is also likely to have impacts on the wider urban 
economy – as migrants settle and new, more diverse communities become established. The 
dynamic effects of net migration may be productivity-enhancing for natives – for example, if 
skilled migrants facilitate knowledge spillovers or reduce trade costs (Saxenian 2006, Page 
2007). Skilled workers may also have a strong preference for diversity (Florida 2002). This 
suggests that net migration leads to higher native productivity and wages, employment rates – 
and local cost of living.  
  
Alternatively, parts of the local economy may become progressively ‘migrant-
dependent’ – specifically, employers in low-cost sectors such as food processing become 
reliant on cheap migrant labour (Stenning et al 2006). Net migration will impact negatively 
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on native employment, especially if lower-skilled British-born workers are unable to move 
into better jobs. If this helps sustain a low-skills equilibrium (Finegold and Soskice 1988), 
wages and prices may also fall over the long term as the area’s economy continues to perform 
sub-optimally.  
 
These two mechanisms will largely determine the long-term effects of migration on 
urban economies. Some of this will be captured via changes in wages and employment, but 
will also show up in productivity and local prices. UK studies usually ignore these wider 
processes, both in theoretical frameworks and in time periods studied. Furthermore, most 
studies do not look at how migration and diversity affect ‘real’ local economies, because they 
use essentially arbitrary administrative units.  
 
This paper contributes to filling these gaps for the UK, drawing on the pioneering 
work of Ottaviano and Peri in the US (2007, 2006). Robust time-series data on migration and 
diversity is very hard to find for British cities. To overcome these limitations, the analysis has 
several novel features. I assemble a new 16-year panel of urban economies from aggregated 
microdata. By using 2001 Travel to Work Areas as spatial units, I am able to estimate actual 
impacts on local economies. I use a Fractionalisation Index to investigate links between 
migration and changes in UK-born wages, employment rates and local house prices. I am 
able to explore in detail economic interactions between different skill groups of migrants and 
natives. The model also allows inference on migrant-related changes in urban labour 
productivity, exploiting the fact that over time, productivity changes tend to be reflected in 
wage rates (Combes et al 2005).  
 
The results are robust to various checks and survive instrumental variables regression. 
They suggest significant long term impacts of net migration on urban economies, within and 
beyond the labour market. Specifically, the diversity migrants bring helps drive up high skill 
native productivity and wages, suggesting the presence of both production complementarities 
and relative scarcity effects. Conversely, increasingly migrant-intensive labour markets 
appear to be ‘locking out’ some intermediate and low-skilled British-born workers from 
employment opportunities. Results from shorter panels suggest that much of this took place 
since 2000. ‘Migrants taking British jobs’ is an oversimplification, however: the ongoing 
impacts of long term industrial decline and the increasing casualisation of entry-level jobs 
also help explain the employment findings.  
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The paper is structured as follows. The next Section explores the background and 
policy context, and sets out key definitions and terms. Section Three reviews the UK and 
international evidence. Sections Four and Five introduce the main datasets, and estimation 
strategy. Section Six presents the main results. Section Seven runs through robustness checks 
and presents IV results. Section Eight concludes.  
 
 
2. Background and motivation 
 
My research question is: what are the long-term effects, if any, of migration on the economic 
performance of British cities?  
 
I focus on the diversity that migrants bring to urban populations and workforces. Both 
‘migration’ and ‘diversity’ need careful definition. My analysis concentrates on ‘long term 
migrants’ – those people born outside the UK and resident in the country for at least 12 
months (HO / DWP 2007). Most public datasets, including the LFS, do not identify ‘short 
term migrants’ who may only stay for a few months.  
 
I use changes in urban migrant populations as a way of exploring broader questions 
about the local economic impacts of cultural diversity. There are some important limits to this 
approach. Cultural (or ‘ethnic’) diversity is a multifaceted concept that is at least partially 
subjective (ONS 2003, Bellini et al 2008). Therefore most attempts to quantify diversity are 
imperfect, especially reductions to a single dimension (such as language, religion or country 
of birth) (Mateos et al 2007). Nevertheless, in the absence of reliable multidimensional 
indicators, country of birth is widely used as a proxy for ‘diversity as a whole’ – because it is 
objective, and because rich data is available.  
 
There are several reasons to be interested in the economics of migration, particularly 
at urban level.1 Long term migration flows into the UK are relatively small – between 1971 
and 2006 the UK population grew by 8.2%, while the US population grew by 44.6%, with 
migration the main driver in both cases (Blanchflower 2007).  
                                                 
1
 The focus of this paper is on migration in cities, which I will also refer to as ‘urban areas’ or 
‘local economies’. In the analysis I will approximate cities using UK 2001 Travel to Work 
Areas (TTWAs).  
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Since the late 1990s, however, ‘netflows’ to the UK have accelerated substantially. 
From just under 50,000 people per year in 1997, net annual migration rose to around 140,000 
in 1999, and rose again in 2004/5 to over 200,000, when a number of East European 
countries joined the EU (Graph 1).2  Just before the downturn the net inflow of migrants to 
the UK was around 198,000 people per year. The diversity of migrant flows to the UK has 
also expanded dramatically (Kyambi 2005).  
 
As a result, there are now high levels of interest in the impacts of migration on the 
economy, society and public services. Since 2003, ‘race and immigration’ has been one of the 
top three issues in MORI’s monthly omnibus surveys of public opinion. There have been four 
major re-organisations of immigration policy since 2001, and a continuing political debate 
about the merits or otherwise of capping non-EU migration (Somerville 2007).  
 
There is now also an ongoing conversation about the wider effects of a bigger, more 
diverse society (Wolf 2008, Goodhart 2004, Simpson and Finney 2008). This reflects the fact 
that growing cultural diversity in Britain and many other Western societies is also driven 
partly by migrant communities (Putnam 2007, Champion 2006). In 2007 UK net immigration 
accounted for 52 percent of overall population growth, with ‘natural change’ (net births) 
explaining the rest (Graph 1). But natural change includes a rising share of live births to 
mothers born outside Britain (ONS 2008). This reflects higher net migration and differential 
birth rates in some minority groups (PIU 2003).  
 
Migrants are unevenly distributed across the UK. Since 2004, rural areas and small 
towns have experienced very rapid growth in migrant populations (Green et al 2007, Bassere 
et al 2007). However, British cities still contain the largest migrant volumes and population 
shares. In 2002-3, over half of all net migration was to London, and over half of the rest was 
to other large cities (Table 1). The urban share of both migrant groups and visible minorities 
has been increasing over the past decade and a half. Put simply, cities are ‘where the diversity 
is’, and much of this is migrant-driven. 
 
In England alone, the 56 biggest urban areas contain over half the UK population and 
over two thirds of all employment (Parkinson et al 2006). So any migrant-related changes to 
                                                 
2
 ONS Total International Migration (TIM) figures. These will include some British return 
migrants.  
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the economic performance of British cities might also impact on national economic trends. 
According to some commentators these impacts could be substantial.  In recent years a 
number of authors have suggested that there are significant economic gains from migration, 
and that cities help drive these gains (Leadbeater 2008, Legrain 2006, Florida 2002). These 
arguments are reviewed in the next section of the paper.  
 
 
3. Review of theory and evidence  
 
Changes in net migration affect urban economies by altering the size and composition of the 
urban population and labour force. These are discussed below, and summarised at the end of 
this section. I distinguish between labour market change, and dynamic processes affecting the 
wider urban economy.  
 
3.1 Labour market impacts  
 
The simplest migrant-related change to an urban economy is a one-off labour supply shock. 
Its impact depends critically on whether migrants are perfectly substitutable for UK-born 
workers (or ‘natives’). If there is perfect substitution, a one-off ‘migrant shock’ leads average 
native wages to fall. If wages are sticky, native employment may fall too. Typically migrants 
cluster at the bottom end of the labour market, so that the main effect is on low skilled natives 
via labour market competition. Higher-skill natives receive wage gains through relative 
scarcity effects (Dustmann et al 2007, Card 2005). Output composition then shifts towards 
migrant-intensive sectors, bidding overall wages and employment rates back up. The end 
effect is neutral on average outcomes, although low-skilled natives may experience 
temporary wage or job falls (Dustmann et al 2003).  
 
If migrants are not perfect substitutes with natives, they may cluster in ‘hard to fill’ 
jobs at the bottom of the labour market (Manacorda et al 2006). This means competition with 
natives is minimal; we should see little change on native wages and employment, particularly 
if new migrants predominantly compete with existing migrant groups. (If employers react to 
repeated inflows by changing production functions and/or hiring patterns, impacts on natives 
may be more significant – see below.)  
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A large number of empirical studies in the UK and elsewhere bear out these 
predictions, finding little or no significant effects of migration on average native wages, 
employment or unemployment. Some studies suggest small welfare losses for lower-skilled 
natives and gains for higher-skilled groups (see Dustmann et al 2008 and Nathan 2008b for 
recent reviews).  Importantly, studies suggest that although migrants have similar skills 
profiles to natives and can be found across the occupational spectrum, they do not behave as 
perfect substitutes, particularly in the first few years of residence in the UK (Dustmann et al 
2007, Green et al 2007).  
 
3.2 Wider economy impacts  
 
Net migration is also likely to have effects on the wider urban economy, particularly over 
longer timeframes as migrant communities are established. First, migration may 
progressively raise the productivity of UK-born workers by facilitating market access, 
knowledge creation and diffusion. Second, low value-added sectors of the local economy 
may become increasingly migrant-dependent. Native workers may be able to move up the 
jobs hierarchy; if not, they become disconnected from work.  
 
The first channel is likely to raise native productivity and wages, employment and 
prices. In the second case, outcomes are ambiguous. In both cases, welfare gains from 
migration are likely to accrue to higher-skilled British-born, with losses accruing to lower-
skilled native workers.  
 
3.3 Migration and productivity  
 
Net migration can enhance labour productivity in various ways, particularly in urban 
environments. Endogenous growth theory highlights the importance of knowledge and 
human capital to long run economic development (Romer 1990). Migrants play potentially 
important roles in knowledge creation, both as mobile carriers of human capital and by 
influencing ideas generation and diffusion. A number of lab and workforce studies suggest 
that ‘cognitive diversity’ in teams – a range of experiences and perspectives – helps problem-
solving and can foster innovation. Cultural diversity is an important component: workforce 
diversity may be hard to manage initially, but tends to improve team performance over time 
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(Page 2007, Landry and Wood 2008). These effects tend to be greatest in ‘knowledge-
intensive’ sectors, which are largely concentrated in and around cities.  
 
Migrant diasporas may also improve forward and backward linkages for firms – both 
through access to new customer markets, and via increased possibilities for distributed / off-
shored production (Saxenian 2006). Again, these effects are likely to be urbanised, as cities 
both have the highest levels of physical connectivity and large, diverse consumer markets.  
 
By raising the productivity of ‘knowledge-intensive’ businesses and workers, these 
processes are also likely to raise wages and employment rates for the higher-skilled staff 
these firms typically employ. If productivity-enhancing effects are large enough they also 
may contribute to overall urban growth (Ottaviano and Peri 2007). As per spatial economy 
models, average wages and employment rates will rise, reflecting increased productivity. But 
as internal and international in-migration accelerates, pressures on space raise local living 
costs (Combes et al 2005, Overman and Rice 2008).  
 
US evidence suggests that migration shifts are linked to both productivity and price 
gains in American cities, so that real welfare effects are close to neutral (Ottaviano and Peri 
2007 and 2006, Sparber 2006, Saiz 2003). Concentrations of migrant inventors make a 
difference to levels of urban innovation (Hunt 2008, Peri 2007, Saxenian 2002). Migrant 
networks also facilitate international links and reduce trade costs (Peri and Requena 2009, 
Saxenian 2006). There is almost no comparable analysis for the UK – although see Frattini 
2008 (on migration and regional prices), Bellini et al 2008 (analysis of EU regions) and 
Südekum et al 2009 (German regions).   
 
An alternative view is suggested by Richard Florida (2002). In this model, urban 
economies are increasingly dominated by a ‘Creative Class’ of skilled workers with strong 
preferences for cultural diversity. Open and tolerant cities attract the Creative Class, 
improving their human capital mix and attracting new investment. This implies that diverse 
cities might have stronger economic performance primarily because of the Creative Class, 
with cultural diversity contributing nothing directly. In practice, the Creative Class performs 
poorly in both US (Glaeser 2005) and UK contexts (Nathan 2008a). Significantly, there is 
little UK evidence that a single ‘Creative Class’ exists – skilled workers have a range of 
location preferences covering city centres, suburbs and rural locations (Nathan ibid). 
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3.4 Migration and dynamic labour market change  
 
Over time, the structural labour market impacts of net migration may differ from the short 
term effects described above.  New migrants tend to cluster in occupations that are 
unattractive to UK-born workers (Manacorda et al 2006). Against a backdrop of rising net 
migration, the effect is a permanent rise in migrant’ share of the entry-level workforce.  
  
Employers may react to this in one or both of two ways. First, in urban areas with 
large numbers of entry-level positions, employers of low-wage labour may switch hiring 
patterns to take advantage of a constant flow of cheap, motivated workers (Stenning et al 
2006). Some sectors of the local economy – such as food processing, routine manufacturing 
or low-cost retail – may become progressively ‘migrant-intensive’ or ‘migrant-dependent’ 
(Green et al 2007). Second, firms in other sectors may adopt more labour-intensive 
production functions. They may then fill new posts using migrant labour, particularly if the 
new jobs are of poor quality and unattractive to native workers.   
 
If migrants increasingly provide the main source of entry level labour, UK-born low-
skill workers may then be able to move up the occupational hierarchy. The extent of this 
‘bumping up’ critically depends on the quality of available education and ongoing vocational 
training, and on whether employers increase their demand for skilled labour.  If low-skilled 
natives are bumped up, migration will leave their employment rates unaffected but their 
wages will increase.  If natives are unable to move into better jobs, however, the dynamic 
effect of migration will be to bid down low-skill natives’ employment rates. They will be 
unwilling to fill low-paid, insecure positions; migrants will dominate employment flows. 
Labour market competition becomes ‘lockout’. At urban level, average wages and 
employment rates may fall in places where low value-added sectors dominate. As the area’s 
economic trajectory turns downward, prices fall too.  
 
There is some suggestive UK evidence to support this. Since the mid-1970s, 
technological and institutional changes have contributed to wage inequality and job 
polarisation, with rising employment shares for high-skilled ‘knowledge’ jobs and the least-
skilled manual occupations (Goos and Manning 2007). This helps explain persistent spatial 
disparities in many urban areas, which have lost ‘middling’ jobs and seen the share of manual 
jobs increase. Some of these places have also seen large increases in net migration. In some 
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parts of the country (such as the North East) food processing and manufacturing firms are 
becoming dependent on the ‘quick fix’ of migrant labour (Dawley and Stenning 2008, 
Fitzgerald 2007, Green et al 2007). These shifts are often facilitated by temporary 
employment agencies (Coe et al 2006). 
 
There are also difficulties for low-skilled workers looking to move up the 
occupational ladder. Critics point to persistent problems in the UK adult skills system 
(Westwood and Jones 2004). Most famously, Finegold and Soskice (1988) suggest some 
sectors of the UK economy are in ‘low-skills equilibrium’: employers operate low-cost, low-
quality business models and show little interest in changing task skill composition or raising 
human capital. 
 
 
4. Data and descriptives 
 
In order to examine potential effects of migration on urban economies, I construct a new 
panel of UK urban areas, from 1994-2008 inclusive. (For robustness tests, I also create two 
shorter panels covering 2000-2008 and 1994-1999 inclusive.)  
 
The main dataset in this analysis is the British Labour Force Survey (LFS): this is the 
single best source of long term data on migration, demographic and economic data, but the 
relatively small survey size raises the risk of measurement error when used at local level 
(Dustmann et al 2003). I am using the LFS at sub-regional level, which requires safeguarding 
against biased estimates. I therefore use LFS microdata3 to construct a panel of Travel to 
Work Areas (2001 TTWAs), using a postcode share weighting system to aggregate local 
authority-level averages.4 TTWAs have the additional benefits of being designed to represent 
                                                 
3
 From the ONS Virtual Microdata Lab (VML). The quarterly LFS samples around 60,000 
households. Each quarter consists of five overlapping ‘waves’, with an 80% overlap within 
that quarter. As per ONS recommendations, to ensure a sample of unique individuals I keep 
only observations from waves 1 and 5 in each quarter. I then pool the remaining data to 
produce calendar years. This approach gives me c.120000 individual-level observations per 
year, approximately 517 per TTWA. This will be considerably higher for both total and 
migrant sample in the final panel, which is restricted to urban areas only.  
4
 I aggregate individual-level data to local authority-level averages, and then aggregate these 
to TTWA-level using postcode shares. Local Authority District (LAD) boundaries are not 
congruent with TTWA boundaries, so straightforward aggregation is not possible. Using the 
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self-contained local labour markets, act as good proxies for a spatial economy, and minimise 
the risk of spatial autocorrelation. To further strengthen the analysis I restrict the analysis to 
79 ‘primary urban’ TTWAs where the sample sizes are biggest. As a final safety measure I 
pool years together and estimate in long differences, averaging observations across two years 
(for short panels) and three years (long panels).   
 
The resulting panels draw on LFS data (for wages, employment, migration and most 
controls) alongside Land Registry microdata (for house prices) and ONS mid-year population 
estimates (for controls and robustness checks). I restrict observations to the LFS working age 
population (16-64 for men, 16-59 for women), and for simplicity drop observations from 
Northern Ireland. I have 1185 observations in the long panel (1994-2008). At the time of 
modelling Land Registry data was only available for 1995-2006 inclusive, so house price 
data panels cover 1995-2006. I then pool across years, giving me 158 averaged observations 
(148 for house price models).  
 
4.1 Measures of migrant diversity  
 
To get the most value from country of birth information I develop several different measures 
of local migrant populations. In common with most studies I use simple population shares to 
measure the stock of migrants. I also construct a Fractionalisation Index of country of birth 
groups. Following Ottaviano and Peri (2006), this captures the cultural diversity migrants 
bring to urban economies. For group i in area c in year t, the Index is given by:  
 
FRACict = 1 – ∑i [SHAREict]2       (1) 
 
Where SHARE is i’s share of the total area population.  The Index measures the probability 
that two individuals in an area come from different country of birth groups. Similar measures 
                                                                                                                                                       
November 2008 National Postcode Sector Database (NSPD), I calculate the number of 
postcodes in each 2001 TTWA and in each of its constituent LADs. For each TTWA, I then 
calculate constituent LADs’ ‘postcode shares’. Shares sum to one, and are used as weights to 
construct TTWA-level averages.  Example: suppose a TTWA consists of parts of three 
LADs. The TTWA has 100 postcodes, 60 of which are in LAD_a, 30 in LAD_b and 10 in 
LAD_c. The relevant LAD weights are 0.6, 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. The TTWA-level 
average of variable x  is given by (x)TTWA = 0.6*(x)_a + 0.3*(x)_b + 0.1*(x)_c. 
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are used widely in the development literature, as well as some US city and state-level studies 
(Easterley and Levine 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara 2004).  
I estimate the Index using 79 individual country of birth groups, including UK-born, 
and construct separate Indices for high, intermediate and low skilled workers. The Index 
reflects both the number of different groups in an area and their relative sizes. Specifically, it 
takes the value 0 when everyone is in the same country of birth group and 1 when each 
individual is in a different group; it takes the value 1-1/c when c groups are of equal size.5  
The Index therefore is my primary measure of diversity, although for comparison I also show 
some results using population shares and run cross-checks using other measures.6   
 
4.2 Descriptives 
 
Summary statistics for the long panel are set out in Table 2. Wages, employment rates and 
economic activity are similar between British-born and migrant workers, although migrants 
have slightly higher average wages and slightly lower employment rates (thus slightly higher 
unemployment rates). Figures for ethnic minorities are included here for comparison – 
focusing on ‘visible minorities’, they highlight below-average labour market performance.  
 
I create three skill groups based on qualifications obtained, using the UK NVQ 
system as a benchmark. ‘High skill’ workers have qualifications at NVQ4 level or above 
(equivalent to a university degree or other Higher Education qualification); ‘intermediate 
skill’ workers obtain NVQ3 or 2 (equivalent to A-levels or at least five GCSE’s at grades A*-
C, respectively); ‘low skill’ workers obtain NVQ1, equivalent to other/no qualifications. 
Table 2 shows that high skill workers comprise just over a fifth of the sample, intermediate 
skill workers over two-fifths and low-skill workers a third.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide more detail on natives and migrants by skillgroup. Compared 
to the UK average and to residents, migrants are slightly over-represented in the most and 
                                                 
5
 In this research I am using an Index based on 79 country of birth groups. If these are of 
equal size, the maximum value of the Index will be (1 – 1/79) = 0.99 (to 2dp). In practice the 
maximum Index is often 1 due to approximation in the aggregation process. 
6
 Specifically, I also run regressions using 1) migrant population shares from ‘Northern’ and 
‘Southern’ countries, where ‘North’ is defined as EU25, North America, Japan and 
Australasia 2) a simple Fractionalisation Index using 18 country of birth groups. For 1) 
results were largely insignificant on native wages and employment.  For 2) results were very 
similar to the full Fractionalisation Index.   
 12
least-skilled groups (table 3). As a cross-check, the table also breaks down occupational 
groups. Here, migrants are under-represented in ‘intermediate’ occupational groups such as 
administration and skilled trades, but have similar-to-native shares in other groups. In line 
with other studies, this suggests some bunching of migrants in occupations in which they are 
technically overqualified. Table 4 breaks down wages, employment and unemployment rates 
by skill group, for both the whole sample and the UK born. As expected, wages and 
employment rates rise with human capital, while unemployment rates decline.  
 
Across the panel, average levels of migrant working-age population share and migrant 
diversity are fairly low. As expected, London accounts for the maximum values of wages, 
house prices and diversity. Maxima and minima show that even within the set of urban areas, 
migrant communities are heavily clustered in a few places, with a long tail of much less 
diverse locations.  
 
However, migrant communities have grown significantly over time, and the set of 
diverse cities has also changed over the period of study (Table 5).  Between 1994 and 2008 
the average value of the Fractionalisation Index rose by around 10 percentage points, from 
just under 0.1 to just under 0.2, and average migrant working-age population shares increased 
from six to just over 10 per cent. While London has the biggest migrant stocks throughout the 
panel period, the UK’s stock of urban diversity has increasingly shifted into the Greater 
South East. In the table, the Northern cities’ stock of migrants has grown but has lagged 
behind stock changes further south.   
 
The composition of migrant communities has also changed over the past two decades, 
a process documented in detail by Kyambi (2005). Table 6 shows that a number of new 
migrant communities have appeared over the study period – in particular from Poland, the 
former USSR, Zimbabwe, China, Hong Kong and South East Asia.7  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 To ensure comparability over time, country of birth groups are calculated with reference to 
LFS CRYO categories for 1992. This variable aggregates some countries (e.g. Yugoslavia) 
and does not take full account of more recent geopolitical changes (e.g. collapse of USSR, 
expansion of the EU).  
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5. Estimation strategy 
 
I construct a simple model, linking urban economic outcomes to diversity and a range of 
demographic, economic and spatial controls. My estimation strategy is an example of the 
spatial correlations approach widely used in the migration and diversity literature (e.g. Card 
2005, Dustmann et al 2005, Ottaviano and Peri 2006).  The basic model is given by:  
 
 Yit = bDIVit + DEMitc + ECONitd + eSPATit + µ t + ∂i + e     (2) 
 
Where Y is variously the log of average hourly wages for UK-born residents (‘resident 
wages’), log average employment rate for UK-born (‘resident employment’) and the log of 
average house prices (‘prices’), which I use as a proxy for the local cost of living. Wages and 
employment rates are also broken down by skill group, as above.  Productivity gains in urban 
areas are typically reflected in higher long term wages (Combes et al 2005). So this 
specification allows me to interpret wage changes as shifts in labour productivity.  
 
DIV is my variable of interest, measured by the Fractionalisation Index of 79 country 
of birth groups and the Indices of each skillgroup (for comparison, I also present OLS results 
using simpler population shares as an alternative measure of DIV).  
 
DEM represents a set of demographic controls (share of workers 24 and under, share 
of female workers). Both of these should be negatively correlated with wages. The youth 
measure is likely to be negatively related to employment, although the share of female 
workers may be positively linked.  
 
ECON is a set of economic structure controls (share of workers with degrees, share of 
workers in manufacturing sectors, share of jobless who are long term unemployed). The first 
of these should be positively related to wages, employment and prices. The second should be 
positively related to employment rates. The third should be negatively related to wages, 
prices and employment (in particular).  
 
SPAT is given by logged population density, measured as total population over 
surface area. This is a simple device for capturing agglomeration economies, and is likely to 
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have a positive relationship with wages and prices, and an ambiguous relationship with 
employment rates. µ t and ∂i denote time dummies and area fixed effects, respectively.  
 
I estimate in long differences, using moving averages to minimise measurement error. 
Specifically, for the long panel I use averages of 1994/6 and 2006/8, and for the short panels, 
1994/5-1998/9 and 2000/1-2007/8. Hausman tests suggest a fixed effects specification is 
preferred.  For the main results I therefore estimate the model as a two-period model in Stata 
(using xtreg with area fixed effects and year dummies). This is equivalent to estimating in 
first differences.   
 
Initial diagnostics suggest a small number of observations with large residuals in one 
or more of the key years. I run regressions with and without the five largest outliers as a 
simple robustness check.8  London represents the biggest outlier and the majority of leverage 
points, so I also run models with and without the capital.  
 
There are a number of potential validity challenges here, in particular the issue of 
majority outflows (Borjas 1994) and migrant selection (Altonji and Card 2001, Borjas 1994). 
I deal with the former in robustness tests, and the latter through a shift-share instrument based 
on Ottaviano and Peri (2006). See Section Seven for further details.  
 
 
 
6. Main results  
 
The results from the main regressions are set out in Tables 7 through 13. Tables 7, 9 and 11 
give results where DIV is measured using the Fractionalisation Index of country of birth. For 
comparison, Tables 8, 10 and 12 use migrant population shares. Table 13 breaks down results 
by skillgroup cells.   
 
In each of the main tables specifications (1) to (6) give results for the full sample. Of 
these, (1)-(3) show simple results with year dummies, (4) gives controls, year dummies and 
area fixed effects, and (5) and (6) give results for the full model with and without London. 
                                                 
8
 The five outliers are London, Birmingham, Dudley and Sandwell, Swansea Bay and 
Tunbridge Wells.  
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Specifications (7) through (12) show results for high, intermediate and low-skill British-born 
workers, with and without London.  
 
Overall, the model performs well. Before area fixed effects are applied, R2 for 
controls is 0.938 in wage models, 0.636 in employment models and 0.938 for prices. F-
statistics are also large, particularly for wage and price models. Controls are generally of the 
expected sign and magnitude. The model is parsimonious: omitted variable bias is minimised 
by fitting area fixed effects and year dummies: on a two-period model this is a strong 
specification that will remove much of the variation from the sample. 
 
6.1 Results from whole sample 
 
There are positive associations between migrant diversity and native productivity / wages. As 
measured by the Fractionalisation Index, DIV is 0.322, significant at 5%. This implies that a 
10 point rise in the Index, the average change over the panel period, is associated with a 
[(0.1*0.322)*100] = 3.22% rise in UK-born workers’ productivity / wages. For migrant 
population share DIV is 0.484, also significant at 5%.  A one percentage-point rise in migrant 
population share is associated with a [(0.01 x 0.484]*100] = 0.484% rise in resident average 
productivity / wages: a five percentage-point rise, just over the average change in migrant 
population shares from 1994 through 2008, is associated with a 2.42% rise.  
 
In contrast, employment models consistently show a negative association between 
migrants and UK-born average employment rates. For the Fractionalisation Index, the 
coefficient of DIV is -0.228; for migrant population share, it is -0.403. Both are significant at 
5%. The first result implies that a 10 point rise in the Index is associated with a 
[(0.1*0.228)*100] = 2.28% fall in resident employment rates.  
 
The house price models show no significant relationship between DIV and the local 
cost of living, as measured by average house prices. In part, this is likely to be driven by the 
choice of dependent variable. The UK lacks robust cost of living data at sub-regional level, 
and even regional-level data is very hard to obtain (Frattini 2008). I use house price data as a 
proxy for the local cost of living, which is less than ideal. First, including mortgage costs 
housing-related expenditure is the single largest item of UK consumer spending, covering 22 
percent of spend (ONS 2008). However, three quarters of spending is not covered. Second, 
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most migrants tend to rent rather than buy, so that some of the direct impacts of migrants on 
local housing markets will probably not show up in sales figures (Gordon et al 2007).  
 
I run two basic robustness checks at this stage. First, removing London from the 
sample makes some difference to the results, although less than one might expect. Removing 
the capital slightly raises the coefficient of frac on native productivity / wage rates, from 
0.322 to 0.339, and slightly lowers the effect on employment rates, from -0.228 to -0.223. 
Significance levels remain unchanged. Second, I run the regressions without the five main 
outliers. Results are not reported here, but are not substantially different: coefficients of DIV 
are slightly smaller and significance levels fall to 10%.  
 
6.2 Results by skill group 
 
For productivity/wage and employment models, Tables 7 – 12 also provide headline results 
for high skill, intermediate skill and low skill workers. For the former, results are as 
predicted, with DIV positive for higher skilled workers and slightly negative for low skilled 
workers. However, DIV is not significant in any specification.9 For employment models, DIV 
is negative for all worker groups. However, the association is only significant for 
intermediate and low skilled workers, where the coefficients of DIV are -0.292 and -0.497, 
significant at 5% and 1% respectively.  Removing London and outliers makes little difference 
to most results, although in the former case the association of DIV on low skill natives’ 
productivity/wages moves from -0.162 to 0.026 (and close to zero for migrant population 
share).  
 
To further investigate transmission channels, I disaggregate DIV into human capital 
groups, and regress on productivity/wages and employment rates of every native skill group. 
This allows me to look at how the diversity of different skillgroups may affect outcomes for 
natives. Specifically, I can check for potential production complementarities between similar 
groups, and lockout and bumping up between different groups.  
 
                                                 
9
 This is partly explained by collinearity between the dependent variable and the human 
capital control, especially for high skill natives’ wages. When the latter is removed, DIV is 
weakly significant (at 10%) on productivity / wages. Employment results are unaffected.   
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Findings are summarised in Table 13. Productivity/wage results are in the first panel, 
employment results in the second panel. For high and intermediate skilled workers, changes 
in DIV have little link to native group outcomes. However, the diversity of intermediate 
skilled workers has a significant association with productivity/wages of low-skilled natives. 
The diversity of low-skilled workers has significant positive associations with the wages of 
all UK-born worker types: but significant negative links to the employment rates of lower-
skilled natives.  
 
These findings suggest that low-skilled migration is good for the productivity / wages 
of most UK-born workers, and are compatible with both ‘bumping up’ and production 
complementarities. But intermediate and low-skill natives may also be locked out of some 
employment by changes in migration: productivity gains may also allow some firms to 
reduce headcounts.10   
 
 
7. Robustness tests 
 
Section Five highlights two main endogeneity problems with the estimation strategy, native 
outflows and migrant selection. I deal with each of these in turn.  
 
7.1 Native outflows  
 
The UK-born population in a given area may respond to immigrants arriving by leaving that 
area – because they are displaced in the labour market, because of more expensive housing, 
or because they dislike diversity. If this occurs any economic impacts of the migration shock 
may not be picked up by a spatial correlations approach, and coefficients of DIV will be 
biased towards zero (Borjas 1994).  
 
There is no consensus on the extent of native outflows, either internationally or in the 
UK (Borjas 1994, Card 2007 and 2005, Dustmann et al 2008). As Dustmann and colleagues 
point out, levels of internal migration in the UK are relatively low compared to the US, and 
                                                 
10
 An alternative explanation of these results is that they simply reflect relative scarcity and 
competition channels in the labour market. This is not incompatible with the previous 
analysis (see final section). 
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low-income groups are particularly unlikely to move. Gordon and colleagues suggest that 
migrants’ willingness to live at high housing densities mitigates pressures on urban housing 
supply (Gordon et al 2007).  
 
In tests, Lemos and Portes (2008) find no effect of migrants’ arrival on native 
‘netflows’. By contrast, Hatton and Tani (2005) suggest outflows are quite large, especially 
in the Greater South East. More broadly, there is little evidence of ‘white flight’ in the UK. In 
2005 Trevor Phillips – head of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission – warned that 
Britain was ‘sleepwalking into segregation’.11 But the evidence shows very little spatial 
segregation in British communities (Simpson and Finney 2009).12   
 
I conduct two simple checks for native outflows. The first is based on a test developed 
by Card (2005). Assuming migrants tend to compete with lower-skilled natives, Card 
regresses the share of all low-skilled workers on the share of low-skilled migrants:  
 
LOWSKILLit = a + bLOWSKILLMIGit + eit       (3) 
 
If migrants completely displace natives, b should be 0 or close to it. Conversely, if 
there is no displacement b should approach the value 1. I run the test with and without area 
and year fixed effects.  Results are shown in Table 14. The OLS results suggest native 
outflows are quite large: however, the model has little explanatory power. Once fixed effects 
and year dummies are introduced, the relationship becomes insignificant.  
 
I also develop a very simple internal migration model, regressing the log population 
share of British-born workers on the logs of wages, house prices, employment rates and the 
share of long term unemployed, plus migrant population share. Results are shown in Table 
15. While there is a negative association between migrant stock and the population share of 
British-born, other factors appear to play a larger role. Neither of these tests establishes a 
causal relationship for native outflows. And coefficient size suggests that outflows only 
explain a small part of the main results.  
 
                                                 
11
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4270010.stm accessed 3 September 2009.  
12
 Although there is some evidence that increasing parental choice in education has led to 
some largely white or non-white schools (ibid).  
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7.2 Migrant selection and instruments  
 
A more serious issue is migrant selection. If migrants are attracted to the cities with the 
highest economic performance, the best-performing place may also be the most diverse even 
if there is no causal relationship. This will bias coefficients of DIV upwards. Equally, if 
migrants are located in cities that suffer exogenous, negative economic shocks, DIV will be 
biased downwards if the shock is not controlled for.   
 
An instrumental variables strategy is needed to deal with this. A number of potential 
instruments have been developed in the literature. Time lags are the simplest approach (see 
e.g. Dustmann et al 2005) but are hard to interpret in a spatial economy framework. 
Accessibility measures have also been used, based on the fact that migrants tend to settle in 
and around major entry points such as ports and land borders (Ottaviano and Peri 2006, 
Bellini et al 2008). Unfortunately, the geography of the UK makes it difficult to apply these 
instruments successfully: there are no land borders, and many key entry points are regional 
airports close to several urban cores, making it hard to link migrant flows to specific local 
communities.13 Some studies have also exploited recent policy shocks, such as the natural 
experiment created by A8 accession in 2004 (Lemos and Portes 2008). However, it is hard to 
see how accession could be used to construct an instrument for the much longer time period 
studied here. Also, compared to many other countries the UK has made relatively few policy 
changes that have significantly changed migrant flows (Ortega and Peri 2009).  
 
I therefore construct a shift-share instrument of the kind popularised by Card (Altonji 
and Card 2001, Card 2005, Card 2007). The intuition is that migrant populations tend to be 
attracted to existing migrant communities. Using local historical population data, the 
instrument ascribes a share of each country of birth group’s national population share, for 
each TTWA and year in the panel. In this way it removes the effect of local demand shocks 
that might affect migration flows.  
 
                                                 
13
 Lemos and Portes (2008) experiment with an instrument based on regional airports, 
numbers of flights and distance from airport to home countries. This performs poorly for the 
reasons above, and probably because their period of study (2004-2006) also saw considerable 
dispersal of migrants around the UK. 
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The specific instrument used here is based on Ottaviano and Peri (2006). Let COBict 
denote the share of the total population accounted for country of birth group i, in city c and 
year t. Then COBit is the corresponding national share of group i, summed across cities. tbase 
denotes a base year. Then the predicted population share of i is given by:   
 
predCOBict = COBictbase + [COBictbase * (Gi(t-tbase)) ]    (4)   
 
Where  
 
Gi(t-tbase) = (COBit – COBitbase) / COBictbase      (5) 
 
The predicted migrant population share is calculated by summing predCOBict across country 
of birth groups i. The predicted Fractionalisation Index is given by:  
 
 predFRACct = 1 - ∑i (predCOBict)2       (6)  
 
I set 1991 as the base year, using 1991 Census data to exploit the 100% sample.  
 
There are two other potential challenges for shift-share instruments. First, patterns of 
historic migrant settlement may be influenced by historical factors that also shape current 
economic outcomes. This weakness can be minimised by choosing a suitable base year.14 The 
second problem is that local demand shocks within the panel might have an impact on 
national migrant stocks (for example, a construction boom in London during the late 1990s). 
This weakness is harder to deal with, although in theory one could do so by generating 
predicted national migrant stocks – using a country-level model of international migration 
flows, for instance. Ortega and Peri (2009) offer one such model, but it is not applied to 
generate sub-national numbers.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 One might also argue that the instrument does not take proper account of individual 
expectations of an area’s future economic performance (based on past performance and /or 
emerging growth sectors). Thanks to Deepak Hegde for this point.  
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7.3 Results from IV regressions  
 
Results from IV regressions on the Fractionalisation Index in Tables 16 to 18.15 In each case 
model (2) gives results for the panel without London. First stage results show that the 
instrument is a good predictor of DIV with an F-statistic of between 21 and 29 and partial R2 
between 0.29 and 0.33. The instrument also survives Kleibergen-Paap tests for under- and 
weak identification, and passes the Stock-Yogo weak instruments test at 5%. 
 
In the full sample, the positive effect of DIV on resident wages disappears in the IV 
results. The negative association between DIV and resident employment remains and is 
significant at 1%. Coefficients of DIV are now much larger (-0.718 for the Fractionalisation 
Index and -0.942 for migrant population share). As in the main regressions, DIV is not 
significant on average house prices.  
 
Removing London make little difference to the results. Removing the five outliers 
slightly reduces coefficients of DIV on productivity/wages and slightly raises coefficients of 
DIV on employment.  Significance levels are unchanged.  
 
7.4 Results by skill group 
 
Unfortunately data limitations restrict the analysis to regressing means of DIV on native 
skillgroups, rather than running regressions across all skillgroup cells. For 
productivity/wages, DIV is positive for high and intermediate skill workers and negative for 
low skilled natives. For the former, DIV is 0.660, significant at 10%, and stronger when 
measured by population share (Table 16). In the employment results (Table 17), DIV is 
negative for all three groups. For high-skill natives the result is marginal (p-value = 0.073), 
but stronger for intermediate skilled workers (-0.560, significant at 1%) and low skilled 
workers (-0.567, significant at 10%). Again, removing London and outliers does not change 
the substantive findings.  
 
                                                 
15
 Results are generated using xtivreg2. Schaffer, M.E. (2007). xtivreg2: Stata module to 
perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data 
models. http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html.  
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The instrument is not perfect, so is likely to inflate coefficients and standard errors of 
DIV. Conversely, by eliminating reverse causation it should give a truer picture (Südekum et 
al 2009). Overall, results suggest that the dynamic impacts of migration are not uniform. Any 
positive impacts on productivity/wages are driven by gains for skilled workers, while 
negative employment effects seem to be driven by losses for intermediate or lower-skilled 
groups. We can see that the ‘London effect’ also differs by worker type. Employment results 
suggest that while intermediate skill workers in London are slightly better off, low skilled 
workers in the capital are slightly worse off (although the latter result is only marginally 
significant).  
 
 
8. Discussion  
 
This paper has considered the long term effects of migration on a panel of UK cities between 
1994 and 2008. Over this period the UK, and urban areas in particular, have become 
significantly more culturally diverse, with migration a main drivers of change. Migration may 
have distinctive economic impacts in cities, as opposed to the UK as a whole. Investigating 
this is difficult for the UK. Unlike the bulk of British studies I have been able to look at 
impacts beyond the labour market, and at the level of the real urban spatial economy. The 
trade-off is that the data is pushed very hard, but the estimation strategy adopts a number of 
safeguards to minimise measurement error.  
 
The results imply there are significant dynamic effects of net migration on UK urban 
areas, over and above labour market change. First, there is some evidence that migration 
helps drive up native productivity and wages, particularly for high-skill UK-born workers. 
Second, more migrant-intensive economies may have a lockout effect on some lower-skilled 
natives, although others may be ‘bumped up’ the occupational hierarchy. Third, net migration 
appears to have no effect on average house prices at the urban level. All of these results are 
robust to various checks and survive instrumental variables regression, although 
productivity/wage findings are conditioned by the instrument. 
 
The paper proposes two main mechanisms by which net migration might change 
urban economic outcomes over the long term: production complementarities, particularly 
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among skilled workers, and structural change to entry level employment, concentrated on 
lower skilled workers. The empirical results suggest that both of these mechanisms are 
operating in UK urban areas. Productivity and wage gains largely accrue to skilled workers, 
although lower-skilled natives also gain; while employment pressure is largely felt by 
intermediate and low-skilled workers.16  
 
An alternative explanation is that all this simply reflects relative scarcity and 
competition effects in the labour market. Results from skillgroup cells suggest that both are at 
least part of the answer. To test whether the results ‘collapse to the labour market’, I break 
the panel into shorter periods, covering 1994-1999 and 2000-2008. Unreported results from 
the shorter panels find no statistically significant changes to average productivity/wages, or to 
particular worker types. In turn, this suggests that these results from the main panel are the 
result of longer term shifts in urban economies and firms, rather than simple labour market 
effects. Conversely, I also find significant negative associations of migration and resident 
employment rates in the period 2000-2008.  This suggests the very large increase in net 
migration during the 2000s partly drives the main employment results. This is intuitively 
plausible, and the results are replicated in IV regressions.  However, the instrument is now 
much weaker so it is hard to ascribe causality.  
 
Overall, these findings are less clear-cut than similar studies in the US (Ottaviano and 
Peri 2006) and Germany (Südekum et al 2009). Nevertheless, they help explain some of the 
current public conversation about migration and diversity in the UK. Net migration is good 
for high skilled workers, employers and Government, which receives migrants’ taxes but 
typically spends less on healthcare or education (Sriskandarajah et al 2005). On the face of it, 
outcomes seem to be less good for less skilled British-born workers. However, the reality is 
likely to be more complex.  First, across the UK new migrants compete against previous 
migrant cohorts as well as natives (Manacorda et al 2006). I run separate robustness checks to 
confirm this, comparing the main results with outcomes for all workers, including existing 
migrants.  Second, the employment results need to be put in the broader context of industrial 
decline and the restructuring of entry-level work in many urban labour markets.  
                                                 
16
 A striking feature of the employment results is that the effects of migration appear to be 
strongest for intermediate skill British-born workers rather than for low skill natives. This is 
probably explained by the urban focus, which does not capture the large numbers of migrants 
in rural areas, working in agricultural or food processing sectors.  
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To test the effects of industrial decline, I examine economic activity and employment 
rates for the 20 de-industrialising urban areas identified by Turok and Edge (1999). It turns 
out that the areas losing the most employment during the 1980s and early 1990s also tend to 
have the weakest labour market performance during the panel period. I re-run the 
employment regressions excluding these TTWAs.17 Results are given in Table 18. 
Coefficients of DIV on native employment are smaller and only marginally significant at the 
10% level. In IV regressions DIV is also reduced, but significance levels are unchanged. So 
long term patterns of structural change help explain the employment results, although 
migration is still part of the explanation.   
 
Changes to labour market institutions are likely to condition the effects of migration: 
it is simplistic to ascribe the results to ‘migrants taking jobs’.  Several commentators have 
highlighted the growing share of part time and temporary positions in sectors such as retail, 
leisure, agribusiness and routine manufacturing, and the growing dependence of many 
employers in these sectors on migrant employment (Dawley and Stenning 2008, Stenning et 
al 2006, Green et al 2007). One recent estimate suggests 40% of the 1.5m A8 migrants since 
2004 work in agency-dominated sectors such as manufacturing and process work, office 
employment or retail / hospitality.18  
 
Many ‘migrant-intensive’ employers – particularly those in retail, agribusiness and 
routine manufacturing – operate low-quality, low-cost production models (Dawley and 
Stenning 2008). They also depend heavily on temporary employment agencies – which play 
an important role in organising migrant employment, and in some cases take over firms’ 
overall HR function (EHRC 2010, Fitzgerald 2007, Green et al 2007). Taken together, these 
changes have helped produce strata of insecure, poorly-paid ‘bad jobs’, with employers 
increasingly dependent on networks of imported migrant labour to fill them. Migrant workers 
                                                 
17
 I take the 20 urban areas in the Turok and Edge analysis, plus a small number of panel poor 
performers. The final 25 selected areas are: Birmingham, Clydeside (Glasgow and 
Lanarkshire TTWAs), West Yorkshire (Leeds and Bradford), Merseyside (Liverpool and 
Wirral), London, Manchester, South Yorkshire (Sheffield and Rotherham), Bristol, Cardiff, 
Coventry, Doncaster, Edinburgh, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, Plymouth, Stoke on Trent, 
Sunderland, Wigan, Barnsley, Bolton, Hartlepool, Middlesborough, Newport/Cwmbran and 
Swansea Bay. 
18
 Kath Jones and Kevin Ward (Manchester University) point out that 2008 WERS data 
suggests that since 2004, 39% of migrants are employed in ‘administration, business and 
management’, food processing, manufacturing, hospitality or ‘temporary work’. 
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are often exploited or ill-treated (EHRC 2010). UK-born workers may lack access to 
employment networks, or they may be unwilling to take low quality jobs (Samuels 2008). At 
urban level, the migrant-employer-agency nexus may be supporting low-skills equilibrium in 
some areas.   
 
Further research could take several directions. Sectoral and/or firm-level analysis is 
needed to explore transmission mechanisms in more depth. Case study work could also 
explore different types of cities’ experiences in detail. Access to robust local cost of living 
data would allow a proper investigation into migration and local prices in the UK. Finally, it 
would be worth developing richer diversity measures to explore different facets of Britain’s 
increasingly cosmopolitan urban life.   
 
 
 26
Table 1. Net international migration across England, 2002-3. 
 
Area Net migration % England total 
London  77,276 53.0 
North / West Mets  23,822 16.4 
South / East large cities  13,605 9.3 
S / E small cities  10,760 7.4 
N / W large cities  7,064 4.8 
S / E large towns  5,902 4.1 
N / W small cities  3.977 0.0 
S / E small towns / rural  3,825 2.6 
N / W large towns  1,768 1.2 
N / W small towns / rural  -2,281 1.6 
England 145,688 100 
Source: Champion (2006) from ONS TIM data.  
Note: percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics, 1994-2008 panel.  
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
      
Ave house price 881 109951.4 56910.26 40532.387 290353.2 
  
     
Ave hourly wage 1185 9.064 2.079 5.097 17.317 
Ave hourly wage, UK-born 1185 9.067 2.107 5.091 18.069 
Ave hourly wage, migrants 1185 9.456 3.374 2.912 67.75 
Ave hourly wage, ethnic minorities 1160 8.806 3.412 1.39 45.42 
  
     
Ave employment rate 1185 0.741 0.05 0.534 0.844 
Ave employment rate, UK-born 1185 0.748 0.05 0.542 0.849 
Ave employment rate, migrants 1185 0.676 0.109 0.065 1 
Ave employment rate, ethnic minorities 1183 0.62 0.149 0.028 1 
  
     
Ave ILO unemployment rate 1185 0.045 0.017 0.009 0.135 
Ave ILO unemployment rate, UK-born  1185 0.044 0.017 0.008 0.135 
Ave ILO unemployment rate, migrants 1185 0.049 0.037 0 0.435 
Ave ILO unemployment rate, ethnic minorities  1183 0.064 0.066 0 0.934 
  
     
% long term unemployed share 1185 0.266 0.117 0 0.624 
% long term unemployed share, UK-born 1185 0.266 0.117 0 0.658 
% long term unemployed share, migrants 1096 0.257 0.278 0 1 
% long term unemployed share, minorities 990 0.261 0.295 0 1 
  
     
% aged 24 or less 1185 0.267 0.029 0.188 0.366 
% aged 29 or less 1185 0.168 0.019 0.104 0.242 
% female  1185 0.495 0.012 0.437 0.555 
% male  1185 0.505 0.012 0.445 0.563 
      
% non-UK born  1185 0.074 0.046 0.002 0.371 
Fractionalisation Index based on country of birth  1185 0.139 0.08 0.004 0.601 
Fractionalisation Index of non-UK born populations  1185 0.999 0.001 0.989 1 
% ethnic minority  1185 0.054 0.053 0 0.31 
      
% with NVQ4 (degrees / HE qualification) 1185 0.226 0.059 0.085 0.437 
% with NVQ2 or 3 (A-levels / good GCSEs) 1185 0.466 0.036 0.328 0.576 
% with NVQ1 (other / no qualifications) 1185 0.308 0.065 0.161 0.523 
      
% in pro / senior / associate pro and tech occupations 1185 0.378 0.064 0.212 0.583 
% in admin and sec / skilled trades occupations 1185 0.258 0.031 0.149 0.354 
% in PPS / sales / routine / other occupations 1185 0.364 0.051 0.227 0.535 
      
% employed in service sector  1185 0.482 0.061 0.313 0.661 
% employed in manufacturing  1185 0.162 0.056 0.039 0.331 
% employed in other sectors  1185 0.35 0.038 0.215 0.497 
      
population density (total pop / TTWA surface area)  1105 1240.621 793.074 275.37 5846.816 
working age population  1105 118168.3 70806.49 44540.098 452477.3 
Source: ONS / LFS / Land Registry. 
 
Notes: 1) Due to ONS disclosure rules some observations are suppressed.  
2) ONS population data is available from 1994-2007 inclusive. 
3) Land Registry house price data is for England and Wales, from 1994-2006 inclusive.   
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Table 3. Labour market characteristics: UK urban working-age population, 1994-2008.  
 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
      
% with NVQ4  1185 0.226 0.059 0.085 0.437 
% with NVQ2 or 3  1185 0.466 0.036 0.328 0.576 
% with NVQ1 1185 0.308 0.065 0.161 0.523 
      
% with NVQ4, UK-born 1185 0.226 0.060 0.085 0.446 
% with NVQ2 or 3, UK-born 1185 0.483 0.035 0.349 0.593 
% with NVQ1, UK-born 1185 0.290 0.070 0.140 0.521 
      
% with NVQ4, migrants 1185 0.263 0.097 0 0.57 
% with NVQ2 or 3, migrants 1185 0.269 0.092 0 0.916 
% with NVQ1, migrants 1185 0.468 0.124 0.046 0.958 
      
% in pro / senior / associate pro and tech occupations 1185 0.378 0.064 0.212 0.583 
% in admin and sec / skilled trades occupations 1185 0.258 0.031 0.149 0.354 
% in PPS / sales / routine / other occupations 1185 0.364 0.051 0.227 0.535 
      
% in pro / senior / associate pro and tech occupations, UK-born 1185 0.375 0.065 0.212 0.596 
% in admin and sec / skilled trades occupations, UK-born 1185 0.263 0.031 0.151 0.36 
% in PPS / sales / routine / other occupations, UK-born 1185 0.362 0.052 0.212 0.531 
      
% in pro / senior / associate pro / tech occupations, migrants 1185 0.454 0.012 0 0.94 
% in admin and sec / skilled trades occupations, migrants 1185 0.188 0.083 0 0.544 
% in PPS / sales / routine / other occupations, migrants 1185 0.358 0.122 0 1 
Source: ONS / LFS. 
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Table 4. Labour market performance:  UK urban working-age population, 1994-2008. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
      
Ave hourly wages, NVQ4 1185 12.843 2.44 7.953 21.328 
Ave hourly wages, NVQ2/3 1185 8.033 1.658 4.201 14.733 
Ave hourly wages, NVQ1 1185 6.548 1.482 3.764 13.328 
      
Ave hourly wages, NVQ4 UK-born 1185 12.869 2.476 7.818 22.473 
Ave hourly wages, NVQ2/3 UK-born 1185 8.04 1.668 4.201 14.667 
Ave hourly wages, NVQ1 UK-born 1185 6.43 1.413 3.759 20.977 
      
Ave hourly wages, NVQ4 migrants 1163 12.81 4.885 2.008 84.22 
Ave hourly wages, NVQ2/3 migrants 1168 7.841 2.871 1.805 28.485 
Ave hourly wages, NVQ1 migrants 1171 7.548 3.697 0.1 60.788 
      
Employment rate, NVQ4 1185 0.864 0.03 0.717 0.962 
Employment rate, NVQ2/3 1185 0.767 0.042 0.525 0.865 
Employment rate, NVQ1 1185 0.619 0.078 0.324 0.808 
      
Employment rate, NVQ4 UK-born 1185 0.868 0.031 0.704 0.966 
Employment rate, NVQ2/3 UK-born 1185 0.77 0.042 0.541 0.873 
Employment rate, NVQ1 UK-born 1185 0.624 0.079 0.311 0.819 
      
Employment rate, NVQ4 migrants 1183 0.824 0.135 0 1 
Employment rate, NVQ2/3 migrants 1184 0.71 0.158 0 1 
Employment rate, NVQ1 migrants 1185 0.589 0.153 0.01 1 
      
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ4 1185 0.027 0.015 0 0.141 
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ2/3 1185 0.044 0.018 0.002 0.152 
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ1 1185 0.058 0.024 0 0.183 
      
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ4 UK-born 1185 0.026 0.015 0 0.141 
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ2/3 UK-born 1185 0.043 0.018 0 0.156 
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ1 UK-born 1185 0.059 0.024 0 0.183 
      
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ4 migrants 1183 0.037 0.069 0 1 
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ2/3 migrants 1184 0.054 0.071 0 0.692 
ILO unemployment rate, NVQ1 migrants 1185 0.055 0.062 0 0.87 
Source: ONS / LFS. 
Notes: 1) Due to ONS disclosure rules some observations are suppressed.  
2) NVQ4 = degree / HE qualification, NVQ3 = A-levels / at least 5 GCSE’s A-C grade,  
NVQ1 = other / no qualifications.
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Table 5. Cities with the 25 largest migrant working-age populations, 1994, 2001 and 2008.   
 
1994 2001 2008 
TTWA name % non-UK born TTWA name   % non UK-born TTWA name   % non UK-born 
London 27.4 London 33.1 London 36.8 
Bradford 12.7 Wycombe & Slough 15.5 Wycombe & Slough 20.2 
Birmingham 12.7 Bradford 15.5 Cambridge 19.7 
Wycombe & Slough 12.3 Birmingham 15.4 Bedford 19.7 
Bolton 10.9 Leicester 14.7 Luton & Watford 19.1 
Leicester 10.8 Luton & Watford 13.8 Leicester 19.0 
Coventry 10.4 Reading & Bracknell 13.8 Birmingham 18.8 
Luton & Watford 10.0 Brighton 13.7 Reading & Bracknell 18.0 
Peterborough 10.0 Bedford 12.8 Milton Keynes & 
Aylesbury 
17.8 
Rochdale & Oldham 9.5 Guildford & Aldershot 12.2 Bradford 17.5 
Manchester 9.4 Cambridge 11.7 Coventry 16.2 
Brighton 9.2 Milton Keynes & 
Aylesbury 
10.9 Peterborough 15.1 
Guildford & Aldershot 9.2 Wolverhampton 10.3 Blackburn 14.0 
Reading & Bracknell 9.0 Rochdale & Oldham 10.1 Brighton 14.0 
Bedford 8.7 Oxford 10.0 Oxford 13.9 
Crawley 8.1 Huddersfield 9.9 Wolverhampton 13.8 
Huddersfield 8.1 Colchester 9.3 Rochdale & Oldham 13.6 
Wolverhampton 7.9 Stevenage 9.1 Guildford & Aldershot 13.5 
Oxford 7.8 Bournemouth 8.8 Edinburgh 13.2 
Stevenage 7.7 Crawley 8.8 Crawley 12.9 
Milton Keynes & 
Aylesbury 
7.7 Blackburn 8.7 Manchester 12.9 
Blackburn 7.5 Leeds 8.6 Aberdeen 12.7 
Cambridge 7.4 Worthing 8.5 Leeds 12.4 
Leeds 7.0 Coventry 8.4 Stevenage 12.0 
Worthing 6.9 Gloucester 8.2 Bolton 12.0 
Dudley & Sandwell 6.9 Manchester 8.1 Calderdale 11.8 
      
All urban TTWAs 6.0 All urban TTWAs 7.3 All urban TTWAs 10.4 
      
     
Source: ONS / LFS 
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Table 6. The 20 largest migrant groups in UK cities, 1994, 2001 and 2008. 
 
1994 2001 2008 
Country of birth % total migrants Country of birth % total migrants Country of birth % total migrants 
India 12.2 Germany 11.2 Poland 9.8 
Germany 10.5 India 10.2 India 8.4 
Pakistan 9.3 Pakistan 7.6 Pakistan 8.0 
USA 3.9 Rep. South Africa 5.0 Germany 7.9 
Canada 3.3 USA 3.9 Irish Republic 5.4 
Italy 3.0 Bangladesh 3.5 Rep. South Africa 4.8 
Kenya 2.7 Kenya 3.0 Zimbabwe 3.0 
Rep. South Africa 2.6 Canada 3.0 Bangladesh 2.4 
Jamaica 2.4 Australia 2.7 USA 2.3 
Australia 2.4 Italy 2.4 Former USSR 2.1 
Iran 2.2 Singapore 2.3 Philippines 2.1 
Malaysia 2.1 France 2.2 Hong Kong 2.1 
France 2.0 Jamaica 2.0 Australia 2.1 
Bangladesh 1.9 Malaysia 1.8 Czech Republic 2.0 
Singapore 1.8 Other Middle East* 1.6 Italy 1.7 
Cyprus 1.7 Cyprus 1.6 China 1.7 
Malta & Gozo 1.7 Nigeria 1.5 France 1.7 
Other Middle East* 1.7 Zimbabwe 1.5 Kenya 1.6 
Uganda 1.3 Malta & Gozo 1.5 Sri Lanka 1.4 
Spain 1.3 Netherlands 1.3 Other S / E Asia** 1.3 
      
% non-UK born as share of 
working-age population  6.0 
% non-UK born as share of 
working-age population  7.3 
% non-UK born as share of 
working-age population  10.4 
      
Source: ONS / LFS 
     
Note: To ensure comparability over time, country of birth data is drawn from the LFS variable CRYO c.1992. This means that some countries which have emerged 
since are not included (e.g. former Yugoslavia) and there is limited detail on others (e.g. Middle East outside Israel and Iran).  
* = not Iran or Israel. Includes e.g. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon. 
** = not Burma, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka or Vietnam. Includes e.g. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Taiwan, Thailand. 
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Table 7. Resident wage results, full sample and skill groups.  DIV = Fractionalisation Index, country of birth. 
 
ln(ave wages) UK-
born workers 
Whole sample High-skill  Intermediate Low skill 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
div c div_c fe_c maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl 
fracm 0.979*** 
 
0.605*** 
 
0.322** 0.339** 0.307 0.277 0.293 0.307 -0.162 0.026 
 (0.122) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.145) (0.146) (0.221) (0.223) (0.216) (0.221) (0.279) (0.212) 
 
            
youth_24 
 
-3.176*** -2.219*** -0.641 -0.615 -0.617 -0.729 -0.725 -0.711 -0.713 -0.796 -0.823 
 
 
(0.772) (0.384) (0.422) (0.415) (0.416) (0.536) (0.535) (0.499) (0.499) (0.502) (0.509) 
 
            
female 
 
2.023* 0.419 1.441** 1.650** 1.680*** 0.839 0.785 1.484 1.509 0.877 1.216* 
 
 
(1.127) (0.586) (0.631) (0.632) (0.627) (1.002) (1.012) (1.001) (0.997) (0.763) (0.678) 
 
            
hiskills 
 
1.531*** 0.963*** 0.975*** 0.892*** 0.898*** 0.401 0.389 0.104 0.110 -0.055 0.020 
 
 
(0.260) (0.193) (0.228) (0.230) (0.231) (0.298) (0.299) (0.285) (0.287) (0.304) (0.305) 
 
            
mf 
 
-0.643*** -0.451*** -0.001 -0.047 -0.033 -0.019 -0.046 0.259 0.271 -0.324 -0.156 
 
 
(0.228) (0.144) (0.212) (0.212) (0.215) (0.303) (0.307) (0.279) (0.284) (0.293) (0.249) 
 
            
log_pop_density 
 
0.086*** 0.010 0.160 0.123 0.127 0.136 0.130 0.054 0.057 0.238* 0.279** 
 
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.121) (0.122) (0.171) (0.172) (0.139) (0.130) 
 
            
ltu_share_r 
 
-1.236*** -0.095 0.032 0.006 0.004 -0.171 -0.167 -0.073 -0.075 0.325** 0.301** 
 
 
(0.107) (0.097) (0.105) (0.110) (0.110) (0.135) (0.135) (0.139) (0.140) (0.137) (0.135) 
 
            
_cons 2.265*** 1.301** 2.251*** 0.511 0.620 0.576 1.427 1.509 1.225 1.188 0.223 -0.280 
 (0.021) (0.550) (0.257) (0.919) (0.910) (0.908) (1.174) (1.188) (1.338) (1.334) (1.157) (1.027) 
Area fixed effects N N N Y Y Y 
      
N 158 158 158 158 158 156 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F 2292.525 257.806 622.203 1420.819 1344.552 1306.985 402.756 393.948 555.942 544.288 432.170 496.119 
N_g 
   
79.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 
r2 0.889 0.847 0.956 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.971 0.970 0.976 0.976 0.973 0.978 
r2_o 
   
0.785 0.839 0.830 0.712 0.721 0.824 0.818 0.587 0.519 
r2_b 
   
0.103 0.231 0.134 0.050 0.015 0.084 0.033 0.000 0.025 
All specifications include time dummies.  HAC standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
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Table 8. Resident wage results, full sample and skill groups.  DIV = migrant population share.  
 
ln(ave wages) UK-
born workers 
Whole sample High-skill Intermediate Low skill 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
div c div_c fe_c maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl 
nonbrit 1.649*** 
 
1.008*** 
 
0.484** 0.552** 0.515 0.447 0.459 0.519 -0.546 -0.016 
 (0.213) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.238) (0.244) (0.352) (0.374) (0.347) (0.371) (0.596) (0.373) 
 
            
youth_24 
 
-3.176*** -2.219*** -0.641 -0.623 -0.626 -0.735 -0.732 -0.718 -0.720 -0.803 -0.826 
 
 
(0.772) (0.385) (0.422) (0.417) (0.418) (0.537) (0.537) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499) (0.509) 
 
            
female 
 
2.023* 0.352 1.441** 1.617** 1.670*** 0.827 0.774 1.461 1.507 0.784 1.192* 
 
 
(1.127) (0.585) (0.631) (0.635) (0.629) (0.997) (1.010) (1.003) (1.000) (0.789) (0.681) 
 
            
hiskills 
 
1.531*** 0.986*** 0.975*** 0.899*** 0.904*** 0.399 0.394 0.108 0.112 -0.011 0.028 
 
 
(0.260) (0.192) (0.228) (0.230) (0.231) (0.299) (0.299) (0.286) (0.287) (0.301) (0.305) 
 
            
mf 
 
-0.643*** -0.439*** -0.001 -0.042 -0.022 -0.018 -0.037 0.263 0.280 -0.301 -0.152 
 
 
(0.228) (0.144) (0.212) (0.212) (0.214) (0.301) (0.305) (0.280) (0.283) (0.279) (0.249) 
 
            
log_pop_density 
 
0.086*** 0.010 0.160 0.123 0.126 0.133 0.130 0.053 0.055 0.260* 0.282** 
 
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.121) (0.122) (0.171) (0.172) (0.137) (0.130) 
 
            
ltu_share_r 
 -1.236*** -0.105 0.032 0.007 0.003 -0.172 -0.167 -0.073 -0.077 0.340** 0.304** 
 
 (0.107) (0.096) (0.105) (0.110) (0.111) (0.135) (0.136) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.137) 
 
            
_cons 2.283*** 1.301** 2.285*** 0.511 0.645 0.592 1.465 1.521 1.253 1.205 0.127 -0.289 
 (0.020) (0.550) (0.259) (0.919) (0.912) (0.908) (1.176) (1.187) (1.339) (1.335) (1.131) (1.031) 
Area fixed effects N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 158 158 158 158 158 156 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F 2252.748 257.806 615.427 1420.819 1316.841 1296.380 410.119 395.401 555.078 544.291 444.222 497.173 
N_g 
   79.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 
r2 0.887 0.847 0.955 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.971 0.970 0.976 0.976 0.974 0.978 
r2_o 
   0.785 0.838 0.829 0.719 0.720 0.823 0.818 0.548 0.513 
r2_b 
   0.103 0.221 0.129 0.052 0.013 0.076 0.030 0.001 0.027 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
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Table 9. Resident employment rate results, full sample and skill groups. DIV = Fractionalisation Index, country of birth. 
 
ln(ave employment 
rate) 
UK-born workers 
Whole sample High skill Int skill Low skill 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
div c div_c fe_c maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl 
fracm 0.266*  0.207***  -0.228** -0.223** -0.084 -0.074 -0.292*** -0.254** -0.497** -0.484** 
 (0.140)  (0.070)  (0.101) (0.104) (0.099) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.224) (0.230) 
 
            
youth_24 
 -0.823*** -0.939*** -0.186 -0.205 -0.206 0.148 0.146 -0.500* -0.506** -0.216 -0.218 
 
 (0.257) (0.241) (0.282) (0.269) (0.269) (0.202) (0.201) (0.256) (0.253) (0.703) (0.704) 
 
            
female 
 -1.767*** -1.172** -0.491 -0.639* -0.630* 0.130 0.148 -0.589 -0.521 -1.051* -1.028 
 
 (0.539) (0.514) (0.350) (0.344) (0.347) (0.360) (0.359) (0.374) (0.373) (0.625) (0.630) 
 
            
hiskills 
 0.513*** 0.345*** 0.311*** 0.370*** 0.372*** 0.401*** 0.405*** 0.002 0.017 0.355 0.360 
 
 (0.114) (0.099) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.107) (0.108) (0.118) (0.119) (0.313) (0.313) 
 
            
mf 
 0.255*** 0.200** 0.036 0.069 0.073 0.073 0.082 0.220 0.253* 0.167 0.178 
 
 (0.088) (0.085) (0.147) (0.137) (0.140) (0.113) (0.114) (0.139) (0.138) (0.280) (0.287) 
 
            
log_pop_density 
 -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.226*** -0.200** -0.199** -0.089 -0.086 -0.176* -0.168* 0.154 0.157 
 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.060) (0.060) (0.104) (0.100) (0.168) (0.168) 
 
            
ltu_share_r 
 -0.178*** -0.356*** -0.255*** -0.236*** -0.237*** -0.076 -0.078 -0.160** -0.165** -0.193* -0.194* 
 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.063) (0.107) (0.107) 
 
            
_cons 
-0.330*** 0.724*** 0.511** 1.454** 1.377** 1.359** 0.276 0.247 1.331* 1.226* -0.961 -0.992 
 (0.025) (0.245) (0.231) (0.573) (0.551) (0.550) (0.428) (0.424) (0.714) (0.690) (1.185) (1.185) 
Area fixed effects N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 158 158 158 158 158 156 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F 40.126 34.800 35.671 27.625 25.385 24.767 10.570 10.424 6.927 6.943 11.110 10.800 
N_g 
   79.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 
r2 0.188 0.607 0.676 0.695 0.711 0.710 0.471 0.472 0.386 0.396 0.450 0.446 
r2_o 
   0.265 0.234 0.244 0.052 0.060 0.225 0.188 0.107 0.102 
r2_b 
   0.267 0.228 0.236 0.036 0.041 0.243 0.199 0.188 0.179 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
Table 10. Resident employment rate results, full sample and skill groups. DIV = migrant population share. 
 
Ln(ave employment Whole sample High skill Intermediate Low skill 
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rate) 
UK-born workers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
div c div_c fe_c maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl maall maall_nl 
nonbrit 0.415*  0.321**  -0.403** -0.407** -0.151 -0.128 -0.553*** -0.468*** -0.819** -0.816** 
 (0.248)  (0.128)  (0.158) (0.173) (0.158) (0.176) (0.168) (0.170) (0.354) (0.388) 
 
            
youth_24 
 -0.823*** -0.940*** -0.186 -0.201 -0.201 0.149 0.148 -0.497* -0.501** -0.206 -0.206 
 
 (0.257) (0.242) (0.282) (0.267) (0.267) (0.202) (0.201) (0.253) (0.251) (0.703) (0.703) 
 
            
female 
 -1.767*** -1.210** -0.491 -0.638* -0.641* 0.130 0.148 -0.601 -0.534 -1.026 -1.024 
 
 (0.539) (0.524) (0.350) (0.342) (0.345) (0.361) (0.359) (0.369) (0.371) (0.624) (0.631) 
 
            
hiskills 
 0.513*** 0.364*** 0.311*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.403*** 0.405*** 0.013 0.020 0.355 0.355 
 
 (0.114) (0.102) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.106) (0.107) (0.117) (0.118) (0.313) (0.312) 
 
            
mf 
 0.255*** 0.205** 0.036 0.070 0.069 0.073 0.080 0.224 0.248* 0.164 0.165 
 
 (0.088) (0.085) (0.147) (0.137) (0.140) (0.113) (0.114) (0.137) (0.138) (0.282) (0.290) 
 
            
log_pop_density 
 -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.226*** -0.196** -0.196** -0.087 -0.086 -0.168 -0.164 0.159 0.159 
 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.060) (0.060) (0.103) (0.100) (0.168) (0.168) 
 
            
ltu_share_r 
 -0.178*** -0.359*** -0.255*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.075 -0.077 -0.155** -0.161** -0.191* -0.192* 
 
 (0.060) (0.070) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063) (0.106) (0.106) 
 
            
_cons 
-0.322*** 0.724*** 0.526** 1.454** 1.343** 1.341** 0.262 0.242 1.277* 1.205* -1.019 -1.018 
 (0.024) (0.245) (0.235) (0.573) (0.547) (0.548) (0.427) (0.424) (0.702) (0.687) (1.193) (1.186) 
Area fixed effects N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 158 158 158 158 158 156 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F 40.350 34.800 34.616 27.625 25.523 24.950 10.600 10.453 7.309 7.150 11.383 10.790 
N_g 
   79.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 
r2 0.173 0.607 0.671 0.695 0.713 0.713 0.472 0.473 0.402 0.402 0.450 0.445 
r2_o 
   0.265 0.236 0.246 0.053 0.060 0.226 0.188 0.101 0.097 
r2_b 
   0.267 0.229 0.237 0.036 0.042 0.242 0.198 0.177 0.170 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
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Table 11. Average house price results, full sample. DIV = Fractionalisation Index, country of birth. 
 
ln(ave house prices)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 div c div_c fe_c maall maall_nl 
fracm 1.667***  0.828***  -0.281 -0.080 
 (0.305)  (0.177)  (0.450) (0.442) 
 
      
youth_24 
 -3.652*** -4.157*** -1.642 -1.468 -1.660 
 
 (1.318) (1.321) (1.768) (1.643) (1.630) 
 
      
female 
 -3.557** -3.465** -1.351 -1.352 -1.336 
 
 (1.678) (1.656) (1.591) (1.617) (1.592) 
 
      
hiskills 
 2.975*** 2.172*** 0.953* 1.036** 1.000* 
 
 (0.386) (0.413) (0.496) (0.513) (0.520) 
 
      
mf 
 -1.231*** -1.221*** 0.565 0.603 0.670 
 
 (0.417) (0.395) (0.661) (0.641) (0.643) 
 
      
log_pop_density 
 0.023 -0.012 1.686*** 1.747*** 1.800*** 
 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.309) (0.339) (0.332) 
 
      
ltu_share_r 
 -0.307 -0.249 -0.304** -0.310** -0.300** 
 
 (0.251) (0.246) (0.146) (0.145) (0.143) 
 
      
_cons 11.749*** 13.715*** 14.044*** 1.535 1.126 0.796 
 (0.053) (0.746) (0.704) (2.140) (2.311) (2.259) 
Area fixed effects N N N Y Y Y 
N 147 147 147 147 147 145 
F 1792.911 485.541 502.649 1107.066 1002.025 1060.740 
N_g 
   74.000 74.000 73.000 
r2 0.851 0.938 0.944 0.988 0.988 0.988 
r2_o 
   0.108 0.099 0.081 
r2_b 
   0.018 0.021 0.056 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01.  
Source: ONS / LFS / Land Registry. Note: house price data is available for England and Wales only, 1995-2006. 
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Table 12. Average house price results, full sample. DIV = migrant population share. 
 
ln(ave house prices)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 div c div_c fe_c maall maall_nl 
nonbrit 2.799*** 
 
1.371*** 
 
-0.650 -0.154 
 (0.549) 
 
(0.306) 
 
(0.779) (0.769) 
 
      
youth_24 
 
-3.652*** -4.104*** -1.642 -1.421 -1.656 
 
 
(1.318) (1.324) (1.768) (1.657) (1.632) 
 
      
female 
 
-3.557** -3.514** -1.351 -1.366 -1.339 
 
 
(1.678) (1.652) (1.591) (1.618) (1.590) 
 
      
hiskills 
 
2.975*** 2.226*** 0.953* 1.062** 1.002* 
 
 
(0.386) (0.408) (0.496) (0.512) (0.520) 
 
      
mf 
 
-1.231*** -1.209*** 0.565 0.614 0.669 
 
 
(0.417) (0.396) (0.661) (0.646) (0.647) 
 
      
log_pop_density 
 
0.023 -0.011 1.686*** 1.773*** 1.802*** 
 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.309) (0.337) (0.332) 
 
      
ltu_share_r 
 
-0.307 -0.269 -0.304** -0.312** -0.301** 
 
 
(0.251) (0.247) (0.146) (0.145) (0.144) 
 
      
_cons 11.777*** 13.715*** 14.058*** 1.535 0.953 0.786 
 (0.052) (0.746) (0.701) (2.140) (2.301) (2.259) 
Area fixed effects N N N Y Y Y 
N 147 147 147 147 147 145 
F 1759.328 485.541 490.471 1107.066 1037.504 1061.668 
N_g 
   
74.000 74.000 73.000 
r2 0.849 0.938 0.943 0.988 0.988 0.988 
r2_o 
   
0.108 0.095 0.081 
r2_b 
   
0.018 0.022 0.056 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01.  
Source: ONS / LFS / Land Registry. Note: house price data is available for England and Wales only, 1995-2006. 
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Table 13. Wages and employment rates results for skillgroup cells. DIV = Fractionalisation Index.  
 
ln(native wages), by 
skillgroup 
High skills Intermediate skills Low skills 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
fracm_hs 0.100 
  
0.075 
  
-0.307 
  
 
(0.215) 
  
(0.187) 
  
(0.263) 
  
          
fracm_is 
 
0.015 
  
-0.106 
  
-1.106* 
 
  
(0.324) 
  
(0.371) 
  
(0.635) 
 
          
fracm_ls 
  
0.172** 
  
0.211** 
  
0.174* 
   
(0.083) 
  
(0.099) 
  
(0.088) 
          
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
F 366.465 371.575 439.257 580.606 538.195 536.474 474.232 451.923 474.767 
r2 0.970 0.970 0.971 0.976 0.976 0.977 0.974 0.975 0.974 
 
ln(native empl), by 
skillgroup 
High skills Intermediate skills Low skills 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
fracm_hs -0.081 
  
-0.098 
  
-0.285 
  
 
(0.059) 
  
(0.089) 
  
(0.180) 
  
          
fracm_is 
 
-0.079 
  
-0.399** 
  
-0.055 
 
  
(0.162) 
  
(0.188) 
  
(0.292) 
 
          
fracm_ls 
  
-0.031 
  
-0.124*** 
  
-0.179** 
   
(0.043) 
  
(0.045) 
  
(0.085) 
          
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
F 10.017 9.256 9.914 5.674 6.795 6.476 10.301 9.988 10.354 
r2 0.474 0.468 0.470 0.347 0.374 0.386 0.434 0.411 0.439 
 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies and area fixed effects. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01.  
Source: ONS/LFS 
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Table 14. Test for native outflows, based on Card (2005).  
 
% all low skilled workers (1) (2) 
 skills_ols skills_fe 
   
% low skilled migrants 0.2549*** 0.0504 
 (0.051) (0.052) 
 
  
_cons 0.1910*** 0.2336*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
   
Area fixed effects, year dummies  No Yes 
N 158 158 
F 25.1296 503.0060 
N_g 
 
79.0000 
r2 0.1194 0.9249 
r2_w 
 0.9249 
r2_o 
 0.6056 
r2_b 
 0.3432 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Years = 1994/96, 2006/08  
  
Source: ONS / LFS 
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Table 15. Test for native outflows: simple internal migration model. Dependent variable = ln(% UK-born population).  
 
ln(% UK-born) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(% migrants) 
-0.0807*** -0.0771*** -0.0749*** -0.0833*** -0.0805*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) 
 
      
log_price 
-0.0043 -0.0218 -0.0220** 0.0039 -0.0103 -0.0193* 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
 
      
log_wage 
-0.0568** -0.0766** -0.0099 
   
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.025) 
   
 
      
log_empl 0.2280** 0.2896** 0.2201*** 
   
 (0.096) (0.119) (0.044) 
   
 
      
log_ltu_share 
-0.0174 -0.0065 -0.0065 
   
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.006) 
   
 
      
log_wage_r 
   
-0.0711** -0.0881** -0.0239 
 
   
(0.035) (0.042) (0.029) 
 
      
log_empl_r 
   
0.2272** 0.2721** 0.2181*** 
 
   
(0.098) (0.116) (0.044) 
 
      
log_ltu_share_r 
   
-0.0160 -0.0083 -0.0054 
 
   
(0.013) (0.010) (0.005) 
 
      
_cons 
-0.0839 0.2211 0.0528 -0.1554** 0.0908 0.0478 
 (0.094) (0.241) (0.120) (0.065) (0.193) (0.121) 
Year dummies 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Area fixed effects 
  
Y 
  
Y 
N 147 147 147 147 147 147 
F 75.0915 62.1244 44.6449 89.2802 72.3441 48.6430 
r2 0.8197 0.8318 0.7672 0.8163 0.8251 0.7678 
Years = 1994/6 – 2004/6. HAC standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Source: ONS / LFS 
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Table 16. Results for IV regressions, resident wages and resident employment rates 
 
ln(ave wages) 
UK-born workers  
Whole sample  High skill workers  Intermediate skill Low skill workers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
fracm 0.142 0.222 0.660* 0.523 0.154 0.223 -1.467 -0.388 
 (0.298) (0.362) (0.364) (0.415) (0.319) (0.394) (0.955) (0.529) 
         
Area fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 158 156 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F 1305.108 1297.896 452.435 428.078 556.269 558.035 319.553 478.934 
N_g 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 
r2 0.989 0.989 0.970 0.970 0.976 0.976 0.966 0.977 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
 
 
First-stage results, whole sample including London  
 
Variable  Partial R2 F (1, 78)  P-value  
Fracm 0.2868 21.79 0.0000 
 
 
ln(ave employment rate)  
UK-born workers 
Whole sample High skill workers Intermediate skill Low skill workers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
fracm -0.718*** -0.799*** -0.256* -0.223 -0.968*** -0.852*** -0.719** -0.679* 
 
(0.173) (0.209) (0.142) (0.166) (0.212) (0.217) (0.288) (0.361) 
         
Area fixed effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 158 156 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F 19.901 18.825 11.044 10.724 6.055 5.892 10.333 9.762 
N_g 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 79.000 78.000 
r2 0.637 0.611 0.451 0.458 0.123 0.192 0.442 0.440 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
 
 
First-stage results, whole sample including London  
 
Variable  Partial R2 F (1, 78)  P-value  
Fracm 0.2868 21.79 0.0000 
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Table 17. Results for IV regressions, house prices.   
 
ln(ave house prices) (1) (2) 
 ma ma_nl 
fracm 
-1.045 -0.231 
 (0.803) (0.755) 
Area fixed effects Y Y 
N 146 144 
F 1208.685 1180.526 
N_g 73.000 72.000 
r2 0.987 0.988 
HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
 
First stage results, whole sample including London  
 
Variable  Partial R2 F (1, 71)  P-value  
Fracm 0.3296 39.39 0.0000 
 
 
 
Table 18. Employment results removing ex-industrial TTWAs.  
 
depvar = ln(employment rate), 
natives 
FE IV 
(1) (4) (1) (4) 
 all no ex-industrial all no ex-industrial 
     
fracm -0.228** -0.188* -0.718*** -0.572*** 
 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.173) (0.216) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
N 158 100 158 100 
F 25.385 14.062 19.901 10.181 
N_g 79.000 50.000 79.000 50.000 
r2 0.711 0.565 0.637 0.473 
 HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include time dummies and area fixed effects. * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Source: ONS / LFS 
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Figure 1. Drivers of population growth in the UK, mid-1991-mid-2008.  
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